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The Os motic Self and Language Arts Pedagogy
Kristie S. Fleckenstein

D phy, mainstream American pedagogy continues to conceptualize identity and
espite the influence of constructionist orientations in educational philoso

development predominantly as the individual or autonomous self. Evolving out
of Cartesian rationalism, the autonomous self is one i n which ego boundaries are
perceived as rigid and mature individual consciousness is understood as detached,
isolated, and e ssentialized. Thu s, the idea of an autonomous self i mplies a
reality that separates facts from values, privileges scientific detachment, and
justifies the domination of nature (Berman, 1 98 1 ; Keller, 1 98 5/ 1 995) . Learning
based on an autonomous model focuses on mastery. Meaning-making is centered
on separation-separating the subject/text from the writer, the writer from the
reader. Writing and reading are taught as a process of decontextualizing writers
and readers so that they can envision a rhetorical situation as separate from self.
Students are trained to organize the elements of their particular rhetorical situa
tion in a manner best suited to achieving an individually conceived goal. In view
of the social nature of all learning, the i solation of an autonomous student is in
itself troubling. But even more disturbing is that school curricula and methodol
ogy based on the mastery model of autonomy tend to disadvantage young girls
and reinforce limiting stereotypes for young boys. Educators need to evolve
language arts pedagogy that privileges an osmotic, rather than an autonomous,
view of self.
The Osmotic Self
In The Reenchantment of the World, Morris Berman ( 1 98 1 ) , an historian of
science, charts the historical and cultural significance in Western society of the
osmotic or participatory self, one in which the ego boundaries are permeable.
The idea of an osmotic self, evolving out of animistic beliefs during preHomeric
Greece, flourished in Europe until after the Middle Ages and the reign of
alchemy. From an osmotic perspective, self and other are perceived as physically
or somatically linked, as manifested, for instance, in the medieval doctrine of
signatures. During the Middle Ages people believed that eating walnuts enhanced
mental abilities because of the physical resemblance between the nutmeat and
the human brain. Likewise, mining for minerals was perceived as invading the
earth's womb, so the process was treated cautiously, with respect and reverence.
Reality that now seems outside of self was, then, physically linked to the self.
Eventually, in the w ake of cul tural movements c u l m i n a t i n g in C artesian
rationalism, the osmotic self and its world view virtually disappeared from
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Western society. Berman argues that to counter current ills , both cultural and
individual pathologies, we need a twentieth century manifestation of osmotic
consciousness. That consciousness builds on the somatic nature of knowing
knowing that takes place at least initially on a physical or visceral level-and the
interconnectedness of all things .
A twentieth-century osmotic self and consciousness imply a holistic reality.
In an osmotic reality, a thing (or a self) can be and not be at the same time. I n
fact, it usually is. So an osmotic reali ty i s guided n o t by the l i near, critical logic
characteristic of modern scientific thought and ego autonomy (Keller, 1 98 5/ 1 995),
but by a sophistic dialectical reasoning in which opposing concepts (men/women,
love/hate, up/down) are simultaneously the same as reflected in the alchemical
symbol of th e hermaphrodite. Reali ty/know ledge/self is first a process of
embedding or situating, then a process of categorizing or creating taxonomies.
Because reality itself is paradoxical, knowing by accepted means-i .e., the
rationalism and empiricism privileged in Western culture-can only be partial,
especially if the preferred tool to mediate reality is l anguage . More highly
textured, multileveled knowing results from the "union of subject and object, in
a psychic-emotional identification with images rather than a purely intellectual
examination of concepts" (Berman, 1 98 1 , p . 73). Knowledge, Berman contends,
i s initially imagistic, not conceptual, s o reality i s mediated imagistical ly, as well
as linguistically. Plato's attack on preHomeric animism, the root of o smotic
consciousness, was heavily linguistic in nature, Berman argues , an effort to
substitute a conceptual discourse for an imagistic one (pp. 73, 1 05). The ratio
nalists' attack on alchemy-the medieval equivalent of the preHomeric animistic
world view-was also linguistically based. But, regardless of the historical
efforts to oust imagery as a means to construct knowledge, imagery is currently
reemerging as an essential mode of coding reality (Paivio, 1 98 6 ; Sadoski &
Paivio, 1 994).
Creating reality/knowledge/self through "a psychic-emotional identification
with i mages" (Berman, 1 98 1 , p. 73) requires that as knowers we strive to merge
with the thing to be known-to identify with it psychically and emotionally. We
do not, as Descartes urged, separate ourselves from the thing to be known. We
construct world and self-consciousness through a transaction with an other that
is perceived as not self, but knowable only when penetrated by self. We and the
world are what Berman ( 1 989) calls a selfother, and the paradoxical reality en
sues from the selfother fusion. From thi s view, we do not dominate in order to
learn ; we permeate. Thu s , any rhetorical act-reading, w riting, l isten ing,
speaking (and, according to poststructu ral ists, bei ng) in itially arises out of
empathic identification with a reader, writer, or text world as an other which i s
knowable by the osmosi s of self: a selfother. Neither readerly nor w riterly iden
tity disappears in this process. We do not lose self in the process of knowing
other; we lose consciousness of self. Ego awareness disappears i n the act of
knowing. Similarly, meaning is not reified or commodified as an entity to be
possessed. Instead, meaning i s something to be experienced emotionally and
psychically, as well as intellectually. One manifestation of osmotic conscious
n e s s in read i n g and w r i t i n g i s the e x p e r i e n c e of i m m e r s i o n , w h e n
self-consciousness disappears in the doing and all that remains i s the absorption
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in that doin g . ' So, from an osmotic stance, we initially learn for the j oy the
process of knowing (or writing or reading) brings us, not merely because we wish
to take something away from the learning. The joy is primary, the taking away
secondary.
The osmotic self holds the potential to addre s s prob lems, especially
concerning gender identity, created in our school systems by an over-reliance on
the mastery model of education.
The Mastery Model and Gender
American school curricula, structured with traditional pedagogical tech
niques, emphasize autonomous, competitive learning aimed at mastery of a body
of knowledge or set of skills, what Harry S. B roudy ( 1 977) calls "what and how
learning". The goal of the mastery model is to create citizens possessing the quali
ties Western soc iety deems desirable: rationality, analytical abilities, intellectu
alism, and independence. Humanists argue that such an agenda is laudable,
serving Western culture's best interests. However, if we examine its implications
for young girls and boys, we can uncover the ways in which the mastery model
damages children.
The general failure of the mastery model to serve young girls has been
chronicled by Myra Sadker and David S adker ( 1 994) in Failing at Fairness: How
Our Schools Cheat Girls. According to them, gender bias and gender reinforce
ment in public schools continue to privilege the intellectual and psychological
development of young boys. Despite progress since the institution of Title IX
legislation within public school classrooms, girls remain silenced, overlooked,
and under instructed (Klein & Ortman, 1 994). Focusing on science education,
Eileen Bryne ( 1995) in Women in Science: The Snark Syndrome describes the
ways in which schools indirectly prevent girls from participating, let alone ex
celling, in the sciences. Even our methods of teaching language awareness as
early as preschool tend to reinscribe injurious gender practices, prevalent in the
society at large, that disadvantage the educational development of young girls
(Orellana, 1 995). For instance, choosing boys to make statements (i.e., to answer
questions) and girls to ask questions indirectly sets up literacy roles that frame
boys as those who possess knowledge and girls as those who lack it. B arbara
Guzzetti and Wayne Williams ( 1996) conclude that these gendered literacy prac
tices are at least partially responsible for girls in high school science classes
being informally judged as less knowledgeable than their male peers. Because
girls asked more questions and made fewer statements than boys, they were rated
by classmates and instructors alike as less well versed in the subject matter than
their male counterparts.
In addition, girls are further hindered academically by the contradictory
messages they receive from school and the larger culture. Western thinking is
dominated by the ideals of rationalism and ego autonomy. B ut as Andrea Nye
( 1 988) and others have argued, Cartesian rationalism, the philosophical founda1 See M. Csikszentmihalyi ( 1 976, 1 993) and flow; R. Spiro ( 1 980) and reading immersion;
L. Rosenblatt ( 1 978) and the aesthetic experience.
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tion of the autonomous self, is a male-marked philosophy. The intellectual and
emotional qualities valued by rationalists are those qualities marked as mascu
line in our western culture. 2 Men are gendered as rational, intellectual, autono
mous, and analytical (Lerner, 1 986); cultural protocols-those unwritten rules
about how young men are supposed to act, feel, believe, and behave-and aca
demic curricula aim at the development and reward the display of those qualities
in all students. To achieve academic success, boys merely need to be in school as
they have been taught to be in the culture at large. B ut girls are not so lucky. The
West has marked as feminine those qualities deemed the antithesis of rational
ism: intuition, integration, body mystery, nurturing and spiritual concerns. So, to
be gendered feminine, girls are supposed to focus more on relationships than on
autonomy, resulting in ethical stances (Noddings, 1 984), thinking processes
(Chodorow, 1 989; Gilligan, 1 982), and spirituality (Spretnak, 1 994) differing from
those marked masculine. An inevitable outcome of such a distinction is that girls
usually flourish in a learning environment based less on competition and mastery
and more on cooperation and negotiation (Belenky et a! ., 1 986)3• These qualities
in and of themselves are not the problem. The problem for girls is that schooling,
aimed at developing the Cartesian prototype, continues to base pedagogy on the
competitive mastery model and assess girls' success on the basis of their ability
to acquire qualities culturally marked male (Flax, 1995; Guzzetti & Williams,
1 996). The school system implicitly preaches and awards autonomy, while the
culture sends the message that girls should not be autonomous. They should not
compete, they should not win, but to succeed in school they must do both. To win
culturally, they must lose academically, with all the economic and social impli
cations of that los s .
This double b i n d costs girls psychologically as well as intellectually. And
the price they pay is devastating. Adolescent girls growing up in our culture,
spending much of their days in our academic system, lose both a sense of self
and an esteem for self (Brown & Gilligan, 1 992; Pipher, 1 994; Sadker & Sadker,
1 994). B ehaviors such as anorexia, bulimia, and self- m utilation i ndic ate a
growing pathology among adolescent girls in our Western culture. Psychothera
pists working from a feminist perspective argue that self-destructive behavior
among women is a direct outgrowth of the contradictory messages our culture
sends to women. Successful therapy requires that women reeducate themselves

21 am not trying to essentialize either men or women here. Neither women nor men are
innately rational versus innately intuitive, etc. Culturally, however, both tend to be social
ized into certain identities, roles, and attributes. And for women, it tends to lead them into
devalued positions.
3This is not to say that girls cannot flourish in an aversive learning environment. Many can
and do. Thus, those who advocate excluding women from institu tions such as the Virginia
Military Academy and the Citadel argue from erroneous premises. If such an argument
were true, women would not continue to succeed in academic (and military) environments
which are already contrary to gender constraints. My concern is not with women 's suc
cesses in the academy, military, or corporate world. My concern is with women's failures.
Merely because women have the ability to make a poor system work for them is not
a legitimate argument for supporting that system.
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to counteract the cultural double bind that traps them (Mitchell, 1 992).
Boys, less obviously, also pay a price. Education based on the autonomous
s e l f rei n forces i nj urious stereotypes, p articularly rei n s c ri b i ng men in an
oppressor's role (Keller, 1 9851 1 995, chapter 4 on the dangers o f autonomy). The
competitive and autonomous nature of the mastery model o f education fosters
the attitude that a man should master all he surveys. Control, essential to Carte
sian rationalism, i s the basis of the mastery model: control of mind over matter,
man over his environment, obj ectivity over subjectivity. Thus, to be successful
men, boys must win-at whatever they do. They must be on the top of the hierar
chical structures they create, which means that in winning they end up alone at
the top. The one in control does n ' t share the position. I n her study of informal
conversation, sociolinguist Deborah Tannen ( 1 990) notes that a common conver
sational turn for men is oneupmanship. Men use conversation with other men as
another means of competition, as a way to score points and establish ascendent
power positions. The psychological and spiritual impoverishment of such posi
tioning ( Bly, 1 990; Keller, 1 985/ l 995), as well a s the social and environmental
dangers ( Berman, 1 9 8 1 ), is devastating to both men and culture.
By restructuring classrooms, especially language arts classrooms that deal
with core questions about the nature o f meaning, we could help offset these
pernicious trends. An osmotic approach to knowledge is based o n the inter
rel ation s h ip o f all things. Knowledge i s not reified into a commodity, but
accepted as a process of selfothering (Berman, 1 989) because we cannot know
until we are l inked psychically and emotionally with an other. Such an approach
emphasizes cooperation before competition, caring before mastery.

Language Arts Pedagogy and the Osmotic Self
Pedagogically, teaching for and w i t h the osmotic self means teaching
sensuously, emphas izing somatic knowing: the complex tran saction of body,
emotions, and intellect with physical implements and motion (book, pen, paper,
keyboard, marks on the page); our physical environment; our visceral reactions
and state of body; and the self i n the not-self of the text world. Contextualized
within the classroom, somatic knowing might translate into two general goals:
1) incorporation of mimesis, or constructing knowledge through identification,
and 2) immersion, or fostering absorption i n language tasks.
According to Eric Havelock, the major mode of instruction in preHomeric
Greece was mimesis, where individuals identified emotionally with the speaker
or a choru s . In a state of autohypnosi s , the audience memorized the poetry
spoken by the chorus, and knowledge was passed on by this method (as cited i n
Berman, 1 98 1 , pp. 72-73). The point about mimesis for our twentieth-century
classrooms is not the memorizing of poetry, but the emotional identification of
the learner wi th the material being learned, using language as vehicle and cata
lyst. Learning becomes inseparable from emotional involvement.
As teachers we need to consider mimesis from two angles: i dentification
with our students and for our students. Transforming ourselves as teachers in the
process o f teaching must remain an integral part of osmotic learni n g . To make
our classrooms sites of transformation, we need to make our students subjects,
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not obj ec ts . Too frequently, we automatically assume that the interpretation of
reality w e bring with us into the classroom is the

right

one, the one shared by

e veryone. So we uncritically i mpose that interpretation on our students and use
the extent of our students' assimilation as a measure of their (and our) success.
But the starting point for our pedagogy should not be our interior life , but that of
our students. We c a n ' t engage them i n the reciprocity o f teaching without under
standing their i n terior reali ty, the reality that they believe is shared by everyone.
Paul Cobb ( 1 990), a social c o n structionist i n math education, argues that we all
carry with us an expressionist, subjectively real, vis ion of reality. It is both a
Platonic reality-in that truth is experienced as inn er-and an Aristotelian real
ity-in that truth is experienced. as

for granted reality

out there.

The Aristotelian reality is our

taken

that we share without question ( B erger, 1 969). Unfortunately,

neither a student's Platonic nor her Aristotelian reality necessarily matches ours.
To even begin teaching, we must e ngage in mimesis. We need to

know

our

students' realiti e s , and, thus, know how those realities d iverge from our own. We
need to stand i n the ir shoes, or, as Scout Fi nch doe s , stand on the ir front porch
and experience the world through the ir eyes. We need to sit in their worlds and
l i sten so that w e hear their hopes, pressures, fears, and values. Such a position is
by its nature transformative. B y i de n tifying with the i r worlds we inevitably
change our perceptions of our worlds; our starting point as teachers shifts. So if
we suffer the hubris of wishing to change their world views, we are obligated to
transform our o w n , l e a r n i n g first h a n d how that proc e s s u n d e r m i n e s and
challenges e verything we hold dear.
For our s t u d e n t s , we n e e d to h e l p t h e m l earn m i m e t i c al l y , fo ste r i n g
identification i n their i n teractions w i t h the world. T h e "route t o true understand
ing is to be found i n absorption, in the loss of psychic distance," Berman says

( 1 989, p. 1 12). "Who knows more about medieval sain thood-the historian who
compiles data on age and nationality, or the one who goes to a monastery and s i ts
in a c e l l for s e v e r a l m o n th s " ( p . 1 1 5). T h e m aj o r goal of a partic ipatory
classroom is to help our students d i ssolve that psychic distance, achieve the
selfother state through the temporary loss of s e l f

consciousness.

Part of the

answer may lie in encouraging empathy.
Psychologist Martin Hoffman ( 1 984) claims that e m pathy, the sensation of
experiencing another perso n ' s feelings or reactions, at its most sophistic ated, i s
achieved through either a

self

focus o r a n

other

foc us. With a s e l f focus, w e

picture ourselves in another person's place and imagine the s i tuation as i f we
were personally experiencing it (p. 1 1 7). With an other focus we v isualize an
other person ' s situation and responses, imagine how he or she is feeling, and
respond as i f we were there actually observing the action. With both methods,
our awareness o f o u r own ego consc iousness is reduced ( a l though our ego
identity re mains intact); we identify w i th the other. S uc h empathic identification
is the key to aesthetic reading (Pou l e t, 1 980) , teacher-student i n teractions
(McLeod, 1 995 ) , and various writing c hoices (Teich, 1 994 ).
B a rbara McCl intock offers an example of the power o f empathic learning .
As described by Keller ( 1 9 8 3 ) in

A Feeling for the Organism, McClintock, Nobel

laureate in corn genetic s , evolved her revolutionary theory of transposition (the
idea that genetic structures change i n response to the ambient environment of the
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plant) by developing an

intimacy for the

plants she was studying. As Kel ler, para

phrasing and quoting McCl intock, describes, we "mus t have the t i m e to look, the
patience to 'hear what the material has to say to you , ' the openness to ' let it
come to you.' Above all, one must have a ' feeling for the organism"' (p. 1 98).
McCli n tock's ability t o

see

complexity m i s sed b y her fe llow plant geneticists

was a direct outgrowth o f her intimate knowledge of her subjects. McCli ntock's
feel i ng for the organi s m , Keller says, refl ects a desire to "embrace the world in
its very being, through reason and beyond" (pp. 1 98- 1 99). Such a desire y ielded
a "sympathetic understanding" (p. 200) in which self

awareness

was subsumed

in the emotional-intellectual fusion o f identification. In a flight of poetic fancy,
McClintock says that she feel s sorry when she walks on grass because she knows
that the "grass is screaming at me" (as cited i n Keller, 1 98 3 , p . 200).
The second goal-immersion-is an outgrowth of the first . We need to teach
so that students experience flow. According to Mihaly C s ikszentmihalyi ( 1 976),
a psychologist who has studied the exhilaration of "pleasure pursuits" for over

20 years, flow i s a s u bjective state in which the actor is completely absorbed in
her actions:
[A]ction follows upon action according to an internal logic that
seems to need no c o n s c i o u s i ntervention by the actor. He [sic]
experiences i t a s a u nified flowing from one moment to the next, in
which he i s i n control of his actions, and i n which there is little
distinction between s e l f and environment, between stimulus and
response, or between past, present, and future . (p. 36)
W i t h o u t f l o w exper i e n c e s i n t h e c l as s ro o m i n t h e p ro c e s s of l earn i n g ,
Csikszentmihalyi argues, c h i ldren work for the grade, not for the learning itself,
thus gradually coming to bel ieve that the work itself i s negligible; only the grade
is important. When the extrinsic reward (or threat) of the grade is removed, i.e.,
after graduation, there is no motivation to continue learning. However, with flow,
l e arning becomes a l ifelong endeavor.
Flow e x p e r i e n c e s can oc c u r a n y w h e r e a t a n y t i m e d o i n g a n y t h i n g
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1 976); they are n o t l imited t o pleasurable activ ities. We can
experience flow mopping the floor, mowing the lawn, or making puzzles with
our c h ildren. Likewise, flow can become an integral part of our c lassroom meth
odology. In

The Evo lving Self: A Psychology for the Thi rd Millenn ium,

C s ikszentmihalyi ( 1 993) describes t h e characteristics o f a "flow personality," a
person who has learned to control consciousness in such a way that flow experi
ences become a way o f l i fe . For instance, 1 ) they can match their s k i l l s to their
opportunities; 2) they set doable goals; 3) they are sensitive to the feedback from
the activity ; 4) they concentrate e a s i l y ; and 5 ) they don't fear l o s i n g their
self-awareness or self-consciousness.
We can help our students develop these flow characteristics i n reading and
writing b y helping them match current abilities to opportu nities ( i . e . , Vygotsky ' s
zone o f proximal development), by helping t h e m set personal goals (instead o f
merely instantiating institutional g o a l s for writing a n d reading), by helping the m
develop metacognitive and reflective monitoring (Brown, 1 994), by helping them
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learn how to concentrate (as a mother of preschoolers I have discovered that this
is a tough proposition), and by seeing that loss of self awareness is not a loss of
self. Part of the answer may lie in asking students to examine flow experiences
outside the classroom, writing narratives of those experiences-engaging in what
Britton ( 1 989) calls "constructive reflection," and trying to incorporate the
resulting insights into their language activities. Another strategy may rest with
helping s tudents evoke mental i magery both as they read and as they write.
In reading, Mark Sadoski, Ernest Goetz, and Susan Kangiser ( 1 985) suggest the
connection between the evocation of mental imagery and emotional interaction
with an evolving text world, while my work ( 1 99 1 ; 1 993) in writing correlates
mental imagery to text engagement and writing frequency in proficient and un
der prepared college writers. The possibilities are legion, and the potential of
flow worth our effort.
Beyond Pedagogy
Classroom and world implicate each other. How we create self and reality in
our classrooms will automatically impinge on our students ' self an d reality
outside of the classroom . So an interiority and a world view ari sing out of
identification, selfothering, and flow holds the potential of transforming our so
cial reality. It is difficult to lash out-physically and emotionally-at an other
when we define self by means of other, when self and other interpenetrate. When
we conceive of self and reality as a web of being, as well as a web of meaning,
we will inevitably be more careful about maintaining the fragile threads that
constitute and bind us. Basing our language arts pedagogy on the osmotic self
may be one way we can preserve our children's well-being and preserve the world
for our children. i2l
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